Gridlocked justice: Legislative opportunity and criminal sentencing reform in the US states, 2000—2019

Abstract

Sentencing reform is a crucial policy lever for ending mass incarceration, yet little research examines why states adopt policies that lower criminal sentences. Established explanations typically assume that consensus among lawmakers motivates crime policy change. But this argument overlooks growing partisan divisions that stymy policy processes. This study develops an alternative, but complementary, perspective on legislative opportunity that considers how characteristics of legislative environments may either enable or constrain lawmakers’ ability to translate sentencing reform initiatives into policy. It tests this view by analyzing new data on 149 state sentencing reform policy adoptions between 2000 and 2019. States with low revenue and high correctional spending are more likely to adopt sentencing reform policies, but these effects are concentrated among unified governments, especially Republican ones. Elite polarization is negatively related to policy adoption, and this effect is largest in divided governments. Crime and minority group size have limited effect. These results underscore the importance of accounting for legislative environments when examining crime policy change and provide evidence that political consensus may be insufficient to motivate sentencing reform in the absence of legislative opportunity.